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1.0 Executive summary 
 
Behavioural taxes are taxes that are designed to influence behaviour against consumption. The 
application of behavioural taxes is fundamentally illiberal. They interfere with the rights and 
freedoms of individuals to make choices about their own consumption.   
Behavioural taxes generally take the form of excise taxes.   
Australia has a complicated and inconsistent form of behavioural tax in the form of an alcohol excise 
tax, with three separate taxing regimes - differing rates of excise, the wine equalization tax and 
customs.  
The efficacy of behavioural taxes is also questionable.  
Research shows that significant behavioural taxes may influence the behaviour of moderate 
drinkers, but not the heavy drinkers that the policy was designed to influence.  Similarly, behavioural 
taxes for alcohol appear to be less effective with young people who have higher disposable incomes.  
Not all alcoholic products have seen a decline. There has been a progressive increase in the 
consumption of wine, with only modest increases in the consumption of spirits and ready-to-drink 
beverages.  
The Rudd government’s 2008 alcopops tax prompted a rapid decline in consumption of RTDs.  
However, the evidence is that consumers substituted RTDs with privately mixed spirits, and 
potentially white wine and cider.   
The rising price of alcohol at venues is leading young people to engage in ‘preloading’ by consuming 
large volumes of cheaper alcohol in private homes before going to a bar or club. Research also 
identified that there was no reduction in the consequences associated with alcohol, such as alcohol-
related hospital admission rates.  
Academic evidence suggests potential substitution from alcohol to illicit drugs. 
Similarly, the rising cost of tobacco taxes can similarly prompt consumers to switch from legal 
products to illegal ‘chop-chop’ or counterfeit tobacco products.  
The Danish fat tax has been identified as delivering equally perverse outcomes. Some consumers 
had been crossing national borders to buy products with saturated fat contents from neighbouring 
countries, while no notable change in consumer behaviour has been identified.  
International analysis has identified that behavioural taxes are regressive. They explicitly target 
inelastic goods that make up a proportionally higher share of Australian household incomes, 
particularly related to food and beverages. 
The consistency of taxation across all alcohol products is logical as the current taxation 
arrangements deliver perverse outcomes.  However, any change should not be used as justification 
to increase tax revenue.   
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2.0 Abbreviations  
 
ABS  Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ANPHA  Australian National Preventative Health Agency 
AUD$  Australian dollar 
EDNP  Energy dense, nutrient poor 
GST  Goods and services tax 
NHS  National Health Service 
NPHT  National Preventative Health Taskforce 
RTDs  Read-to-drink 
WET  Wine equalisation tax 
WHO  World Health Organisation  
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3.0 Introduction 
 
Under the banner of health and welfare, governments are increasingly seeking to influence the 
behaviour of consumers and ward off deemed undesirable consequences from consumption 
behaviour.  
 
In recent years, Australia has been at the front of this trend with ever-expanding laws, regulations 
and taxes designed to steer consumer behaviour away from costly consequences incurred by public 
finances.  
 
A central plank of this policy approach has been the use of behavioural taxes against ‘sin’ products 
such as alcohol and tobacco. There have also been suggestions that specific taxes should be imposed 
on sugary, salty and fatty foods. 
 
While a blunt instrument, behavioural taxation has become a common proposal for advocates for 
greater government intervention to influence the choice of individuals. Taxation is common because 
it generally avoids the need for harsh and complex regulation that adds significant costs to 
businesses, or results in banning products for consumers.  
 
Behavioural taxes are regularly promoted by their sponsors as one of, if not the most, effective 
policy instrument to influence consumer behaviour, without a holistic assessment of their 
consequences. Yet the model of implementation of taxes can have a significant impact on the 
efficacy as a measure to influence behaviour. 
 
This paper will critically explore the intent and impact of behavioural taxation. It will look at recent 
examples of their application, particularly in light of recent reviews that have specifically looked at 
reforms of behavioural taxation.  Although other goods are examined, this paper will particularly 
focus on the taxation of alcohol and its effect on alcohol consumption.   
 
This paper will also assess whether recently imposed behavioural taxes have succeeded by assessing 
their impact against their stated objectives, as well as the unintended consequences that they have 
prompted, particularly looking at their targeted audience.   
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4.0  The objective of behavioural taxes 
 
Advances in medical technology and improved standards of living have ensured people are living 
longer and healthier lives. The decline in previously prevalent diseases has ensured risks to people’s 
health, especially in developed countries, come from non-communicable diseases often associated 
with lifestyle factors, and no longer indiscriminate communicable diseases.  
 
This general trend is an extremely positive development for humanity and is also becoming more 
common in developing countries where scarcity and famine are being replaced with diseases of 
affluence, including obesity and diabetes.  
 
Partly in response to the relatively indiscriminate nature of threats to population health, developed 
countries, in particular, implemented State-sponsored health systems throughout the 20th Century 
underpinned by the principles of universality and equity. In Britain, the NHS evolved after the 
Second World War to address the equity gap to access healthcare services. In Australia, healthcare 
was primarily provided through a private system of doctors and hospitals financed by individuals 
through private insurance and charity to ensure equity. In the 1970s, the Federal government took 
control of financing primary care through Medicare. Medicare built on the same broad principles 
that guided the development of Britain’s NHS.  
 
The intent of a single-payer model health system was to ensure that no person was unfairly denied 
medical treatment, but it was also based on a broad expectation of the indiscriminate nature of the 
health risks individuals faced. As people’s health has improved, the nature of many health risks now 
faced are not indiscriminate, but discriminate and heavily influenced by an individual’s behaviour, 
lifestyle and consumption choices. Because many new health challenges are essentially a 
consequence of people’s choices and can be managed or corrected using expensive procedures 
(such as transplants) and technology (pharmaceuticals), the cost to the public health system has 
increased. These problems are exacerbated as a direct result of an ageing population where the 
costs of healthcare rise dramatically as older people manage chronic diseases, pain and extend their 
lives.  
 
The central problem with a public health system whose costs are rising as a direct result of lifestyle 
choices is that the gains of people’s individual behaviour are essentially private, and the costs are 
born by the public health system. In response, many advocate that people’s individual choices 
should be ceased, curtailed or influenced to reduce the cost to the public health system.  
 
In the Western liberal democratic tradition, such an approach brings with it many philosophical and 
practical problems. Liberal democracies are broadly designed for the State to preserve and protect 
people’s freedoms from the excess power of government, not from each other and especially not 
from themselves. In a liberal democracy the individual has a right to self-determination. The 
principle of limiting people’s choices turns these principles on their head by arguing that the 
priorities of a centralised government agency and collective interests takes precedence over the 
rights of individuals to live their own lives freely.  
 
Similarly, the idea that the collective has a stake in every individual’s health significantly belittles the 
dignity of the individual and their rights over their own life and choices. Such an approach also 
inevitably assumes that a poorly-informed and distant government knows what is in an individual’s 
best interests. Individuals always have substantially more information about their own interests and 
priorities. By placing individual interest second to the collective interest, the resulting decisions take 
on a technocratic spirit where questions about ‘whether’ the government should interfere are 
second-order to ‘how’ the government should interfere. Likewise, placing individual choice behind 
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collective interest leads to the conclusion that the primary purpose of an individual’s life is the 
extent that they contribute or drain from the collective.  This in turn justifies measures to interfere 
in people’s lives on the basis of their individual behaviour’s positive or negative impact on 
productivity, economic growth or cost.  
 
On a more practical level, problems arise on how to achieve the centralised objectives of health 
systems to reduce people’s behaviour which may lead to costs without undermining individual 
choice. Recently an approach called ‘libertarian paternalism’, or ‘nudge’ theory has been proposed.1 
The objective of libertarian paternalism is for government to use its full policy toolkit – legislation, 
taxation and regulation – to influence people’s choices without explicitly directing behaviour.  
 
While health is only one of the justifications for an approach to public policy, it is also one of the 
most regularly cited. Because free people tend to resist blunt instruments that seek to tell them 
explicitly how to behave, the use of outright bans are rarely entertained. Outright bans can 
sometimes be proposed on the basis that all other measures have previously been implemented.2 A 
more common measure is to propose a seemingly reasonable measure by government that 
influences people’s behaviour. Doing so conditions the public to believe that there is a problem that 
should be addressed while also incrementally adjusting the public to government interference that 
compounds over time. There are numerous examples of such incremental measures including 
consumer access restrictions, advertising restrictions, product display bans, packaging restrictions, 
license-for-sale arrangements, consumption restrictions and additional taxes.  
 
4.1 Taxation as a policy instrument 
 
Taxation is arguably the most common measure used by government to influence people’s 
behaviour. It achieves the twin objectives of influencing people’s choices while raising additional 
government revenue, which is often argued as necessary to cover the externality costs of people’s 
choices.  
 
Taxation is not normally limited to generic taxes, such as sales taxes (goods and services or value-
added taxes), but includes additional excise taxes that may, or may not be imposed before a sales 
tax. Goods targeted for “excise coverage typically exhibit one or more of the following 
characteristics: first, their production and sales are closely supervised by the government, that is 
they are sumptuary goods or services; second they are characterised by price-inelastic demand 
schedules; third, they have an income elasticity of demand greater than unit, that is, they are luxury 
goods or services; or fourth, their consumption is regarded by the government as lacking merit or as 
likely to cause negative externalities.”3 
 
Behavioural taxes are designed to be in addition to standard taxes to target individual goods and 
services and are specifically designed to “internalise negative externalities generated by the 
consumer.”4 In Australia, examples include: 
 
 Excise on alcoholic products to steer people’s choices and deliver government revenue for 
costs incurred from alcohol-related health and crime.  
                                                          
1
 Thaler, R. H. & Sunstein, C. R. 2009. “Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth and happiness”. 
Penguin Books. United States of America. 
2
 Regulation against tobacco is a clear example. While there is not an outright ban, such a proposal is 
occasionally discussed following years of taxes and regulations that have limited access to the product.  
3
 McCarten, W. J. & Stotsky, J. “Excise Taxes” in Shome, P. ed. 1995. “Tax policy handbook”. International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Washington DC, United States of America. pp100–03. 
4
 Ibid. 
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 Excise on tobacco products to discourage consumption and deliver government revenue for 
health costs incurred by the public health system from emphysema, cardiovascular disease 
and other smoking-related health problems.  
 
 A proposed excise ‘fat tax’ on salty, sugary and fatty energy-dense, nutrient-poor (EDNP) 
foods to cover the public costs of intervention programs, such as lap-band surgery for obese 
individuals, and chronic disease management, such as diabetes.   
 
From a governmental perspective, additional taxation can also be desirable because it can act as a 
measure to steer people’s choices without explicitly banning conduct. But like many measures taken 
by government in the name of public health, there are questions about the efficacy of behavioural 
taxation. For example, while taxation may influence some consumer behaviour, if the product is 
relatively inelastic it can often be imposed primarily for the benefit of revenue collection and not to 
steer consumer behaviour. This proposition was outlined in a recent government tax review that 
stated: 
 
Compared with many other consumer goods, tobacco consumption is relatively unresponsive to price. 
Most estimates suggest that a 1 per cent increase in the price of cigarettes will reduce total 
consumption by 0.4 per cent. This suggests that taxing tobacco, like alcohol, provides a relatively 
efficient source of revenue.
5
  
 
Taxation also has other key benefits. While taxes are desirable because they provide government 
with revenue to offset the cost of publicly-financed externalities, it is also desirable because of its 
relative ease to impose. This is especially so in jurisdictions without sophisticated data collection 
measures to successfully impose broad-based income and company taxes. These taxes require 
relatively sophisticated systems to ensure that accurate taxes are applied as shares of profits and 
income is collected by government in cooperation with individuals and businesses.  
 
By comparison, taxes on sales generally provide governments with a more easily enforceable 
method of taxation. The use of alcohol as a heavily traded commodity and form of currency in the 
early Australian colonies has ensured that alcohol has almost always been taxed to provide 
governments with a revenue source. As identified by McCarten and Stotsky, “the most compelling 
reason for the use of excise taxes is that they can potentially raise a great deal of revenue with little 
distorting effect, generating little excess burden.”6 McCarten and Stotsky’s proposition highlights the 
often contradictory nature of behavioural taxation. While excise may not result in changing people’s 
behaviour, that is often the justification used for its introduction or increasing its rate.  
 
The model of implementation of taxes can have a significant impact on the efficacy as a measure to 
influence behaviour. The major behavioural taxes currently operating in Australia are directed at 
alcohol and tobacco. Tobacco excise tax is applied consistently on a per-stick basis for cigarettes and 
per kilogram for loose leaf tobacco. These tax rates are indexed to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
and are also periodically increased by governments. By comparison the taxes on alcohol are 
exceedingly complex.  
 
                                                          
5
 The Treasury. 2010. “Australia’s Future Tax System: Consultation paper: Detailed Analysis – Section 11: Taxes 
on specific goods and services”. Commonwealth of Australia. Available at 
http://www.taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/ConsultationPaper.aspx?doc=html/publications/Papers/Consu
ltation_Paper/section_11.htm. 
6
 McCarten, W. J. & Stotsky, J. “Excise Taxes” in Shome, P. ed. 1995. “Tax policy handbook”. International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Washington DC, United States of America. pp100–03. 
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Australia has three main alcohol taxes – the excise, the WET and customs:  
 
i. Beer and spirits attract excise based on the volume of alcohol;  
ii. WET is applied to the value of the wine product; and 
iii. Customs duty is applied to imported products and is applied with a mixture of ad valorem 
and alcohol content taxation.  
 
In addition, the GST is applied to retail sales after all other taxes are applied. 
 
Figure 1 | Current effective (specific) alcohol tax by beverage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Treasury. 2010. “Australia’s Future Tax System”. Commonwealth of Australia. Available at 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/Content/Content.aspx?doc=html/home.htm. 
 
The complexity and inconsistency of the applied tax arrangements on alcohol beverages is clearly 
outlined in Figure 1. Similarly, the nominal tax contribution to alcoholic beverages is therefore 
specific to the alcoholic content, volume and commercial value of the product outlined in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 | Excise rates for alcohol in Australia as of 1st February 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Carragher, N. & Chalmers, J. 2011. “What are the options? Pricing and taxation policy reforms to redress excessive alcohol 
consumption and related harms in Australia”. NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. 
Note:  Draught beer is beer served from a pressurised keg or cask. 
 Non-commercial beer is made on commercial premises for non-commercial use. 
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An indication of the complexity is outlined in the Australian Tax Office’s Excise Tariff Working Paper.7 
Table 2 outlines the taxing regime for variants of beer alone, with different methods then used for 
spirits and other excisable beverages 
 
Table 2 | Excise tariff rate per litre of alcohol  
 
Alcohol content of volume Total volume Excise tariff 
per litre 
Where percentage 
of alcohol exceeds 
Beer 
Not exceeding 3% 
Not exceeding 
48 Litres 
$39.01 1.15% 
Not exceeding 3% 
Exceeding 48 
Litres 
$7.79 1.15% 
Exceeding 3%, but not exceeding 3.5% 
Not exceeding 
48 Litres 
$45.44 1.15% 
Exceeding 3%, but not exceeding 3.5% 
Exceeding 48 
Litres 
$24.44 1.15% 
Exceeding 3.5% 
Not exceeding 
48 Litres 
$45.44 1.15% 
Exceeding 3.5% 
Exceeding 48 
Litres 
$31.99 1.15% 
Not exceeding 3% for non-commercial purposes, 
using commercial facilities or equipment 
- $2.74 1.15% 
Exceeding 3% for non-commercial purposes, 
using commercial facilities or equipment 
- $3.17 1.15% 
Other excisable beverages 
Not exceeding 10% - $76.98  
Brandy 
Exceeding 10%  - $71.88  
Spiritsa & other excisable beverages 
Exceeding 10% - $76.98  
 
Source: Adapted from Australian Taxation Office. 2013. “Excise Tariff Working Papers”. Commonwealth of Australia. Available at 
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?Docid=PAC/BL030002/1&PiT=99991231235958. 
Notes: a Some spirits are excise free and have not been listed.  
 
As the Australia’s Future Tax System review (Henry Review) identified, a partial reason for the 
inconsistency between alcohol taxation arrangements is a direct consequence of seeking to use 
taxation as a policy measure to steer behavioural choices. In response the Henry Review suggested 
“a common alcohol tax that does not discriminate between beverage types.”8 
 
Even with standardisation, the capacity for excise taxes to influence behaviour is dependent on the 
price elasticity of a good. Price elasticity is essentially the capacity for price to change consumption 
behaviour. Some products are more price elastic or inelastic. For example, a household’s energy or 
water consumption is generally considered to be more inelastic because consumption is based on 
necessity. By comparison consumption of luxury items are considered to be elastic because they are 
discretionary.  
                                                          
7
 Australian Taxation Office. 2013. “Excise Tariff Working Papers”. Commonwealth of Australia. Available at 
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?Docid=PAC/BL030002/1&PiT=99991231235958. 
8
 The Treasury. 2010. “Australia’s Future Tax System”. Commonwealth of Australia. Available at 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/Content/Content.aspx?doc=html/home.htm. 
   
   
February 2014 Institute of Public Affairs 9 
 
 
The other objective is to make the tax system more progressive and tax wealthier individuals and 
households with a higher share of the tax burden compared to those on lower incomes.  
 
Excise taxes on non-essential goods are assumed to be a good mechanism for achieving progressivity 
because lower income individuals and households are assumed to consume a lower share as income 
is apportioned towards essential goods and services.  
 
To use excise as a mechanism to promote progressivity requires a series of circumstances to exist. 
First, there is low elasticity. Second, the targeted product should be consumed by upper and middle 
income households compared to low-income households. Third, where excise hits products 
consumed by lower-income households a lower differentiated tax rate should apply. Fourth, it must 
be efficiently applied. Finally, it must be seen by consumers as being progressive. If excise does not 
broadly adhere to these principles it is unlikely to successfully operate as a form of progressive 
taxation.9 
 
As Section 8 of this paper details, the data suggests that behavioural taxes are often regressive.   
                                                          
9
 McCarten, W. J. & Stotsky, J. “Excise Taxes” in Shome, P. ed. 1995. “Tax policy handbook”. International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Washington DC, United States of America. pp100–03. 
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5.0 Recent recommendations for behavioural taxes 
 
There have been two recent significant reviews that have considered the role of behavioural taxes: 
the Henry Review and the NPHT report.   
 
Reforming behavioural taxes was a key focus of the Rudd government’s ‘root and branch’ review of 
the taxation system – Australia’s Future Tax System Review (Henry Review). The Henry Review, 
which excluded the GST, was designed to propose tax reform proposals to address vertical fiscal 
imbalance challenges and ensuring government revenue to “address demographic, social, economic 
and environmental challenges.”10 In the context of behavioural taxation, the Henry Review looked at 
reforming taxes on alcohol, tobacco and gambling.  
 
The Henry Review did not recommend any substantial changes to tobacco taxation in Section E6 of 
the report beyond supporting the existing arrangements, including indexing increases to wages and 
not CPI and reducing duty-free allowances at airports.11  
 
The Henry Review also did little to recommend changes to gambling taxes in Chapter E7, because 
the report identified that: 
 
It is not clear how problem gamblers react to higher taxes. In some forms of gambling, the price of 
gambling is not easily observable. Even if problem gamblers do observe changes in price, it is not clear 
that they respond by reducing the amount they lose. Gambling taxes that more than recoup 
economic rent earned by gambling businesses do, however, impose costs on responsible gamblers, 
who must pay higher prices for their entertainment.
12
 
 
In response the review only focused on the need for further review of gambling taxes, the removal 
of tax discounts on certain venues and re-assessing the method for regulating gambling between 
State and Federal governments.13  
 
The Section E5 of the Detailed Analysis of the Final Report specifically considered alcohol taxation, 
and concluded: 
  
 Taxes on alcohol should be set to address the spillover costs imposed on the community of alcohol 
abuse, when this delivers a net gain to the community's wellbeing and is more effective than 
alternative policies. Raising revenue is a by-product, not the goal, of taxing alcohol. The tax rate 
should be based on evidence of spillover costs, and levied on a common volumetric basis across all 
forms of alcohol, regardless of place, method or scale of production. 
 
 While the abuse of alcohol imposes significant costs on society, these are not effectively targeted by 
current tax and subsidy arrangements for alcohol, which are complex and have conflicting policy 
rationales. In particular, the wine equalisation tax, as a value-based revenue-raising tax, is not well 
suited to reducing social harm. 
                                                          
10
 The Treasury. 2010. “Australia’s Future Tax System”. Commonwealth of Australia. Available at 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/Content/Content.aspx?doc=html/home.htm. 
11
 The Treasury. 2010. “Australia’s Future Tax System: Final Report: Detailed Analysis – Chapter E6: Tobacco 
Taxation”. Commonwealth of Australia. Available at 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/FinalReport.aspx?doc=html/publications/Papers/Final_Report_Part_
2/chapter_e6-3.htm. 
12
 The Treasury. 2010. “Australia’s Future Tax System: Final Report: Detailed Analysis – Chapter E7: Gambling 
Taxation”. Commonwealth of Australia. Available at 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/FinalReport.aspx?doc=html/publications/Papers/Final_Report_Part_
2/chapter_e7-3.htm. 
13
 Ibid. 
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 A common volumetric tax on alcohol would better address social harm through closer targeting of 
social costs. A rate based on evidence of net social costs would help balance the benefits from alcohol 
consumption with its social costs. Moreover, by removing the distinction between different 
manufacturing processes, the compliance and administration cost of the existing excise system would 
be reduced. 
 
 In the short term, several specific changes should be made to address the more pressing social costs 
of alcohol consumption, and to remove structural anomalies in the system of alcohol taxes. The 
transition to a common alcohol tax should be phased in over a longer term, to ensure that producers 
and consumers have time to adjust to the changes.
14
 
 
In response to the study by the Henry Review, it was recommended that a volumetric tax be applied 
to alcoholic beverages with “the rate of tax on alcohol … based on evidence of marginal social cost”.  
 
While neither the Rudd nor the Gillard governments went on to impose a volumetric tax, the idea 
continues to be debated. Outside of government similar proposals have been recommended by the 
Australian Chronic Disease Prevention Alliance, an alliance made up of the Heart Foundation, Cancer 
Council Australia, Kidney Health Australia, Diabetes Australia and the Stroke Foundation. In a 
statement, the Alliance have outlined a broad approach to alcohol taxation, including that “all 
alcohol products sold in Australia should be taxed on the basis of alcohol content through the 
introduction of a volumetric excise duty”. Although they have also stated that “changes to tax levels 
should not allow prices for alcohol products to decrease, other than for low alcohol products.”15 
 
The 2009 NPHT reviewed the role of behavioural taxes to target consumption of tobacco, salty, 
sugary and fatty EDNP to reduce obesity and alcohol. In assessing behavioural taxes the report 
concluded in a number of sections that behavioural taxation was a desirable policy instrument to 
influence consumer behaviour and proposed, among many other recommendations: 
 
 Conduct[ing] research on economic barriers and enablers, policies and tax incentives to 
inform a national active living framework and actions” to reduce obesity rates. 
 
 Commission a review of economic policies and taxation systems, and develop methods for 
using taxation, grants, pricing, incentives and/or subsidies to promote production, access to 
and consumption of healthier foods” to reduce obesity rates. 
 
 Further increase price of cigarettes to keep pace with international best practice” to reduce 
consumption. 
 
 Implement and enforce measures to prevent increases in illicit [tobacco] trade” that 
contribute to substitution. 
 
 Commission independent modelling under the auspices of Health, Treasury and an industry 
panel for a rationalised tax and excise regime for alcohol that discourages harmful 
consumption and promotes safer consumption. 
                                                          
14
 The Treasury. 2010. “Australia’s Future Tax System: Final Report: Detailed Analysis – Chapter E5: Alcohol 
Taxation”. Commonwealth of Australia. Available at 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/FinalReport.aspx?doc=html/Publications/Papers/Final_Report_Part_
2/chapter_e5.htm.  
15
 Australian Chronic Disease Prevention Alliance. 2011. “Alcohol pricing an taxation position statement”. 
Available at http://www.cancer.org.au/content/pdf/ACDPA/110930-Final-ACDPA-PS-Alcohol-Taxation-
position-paper.pdf. 
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 Develop the public interest case for minimum (floor) price of alcohol to discourage harmful 
consumption and promote safe consumption. 
 
 Direct a proportion of revenue from alcohol taxation towards initiatives that prevent 
alcohol-related societal harm.16 
 
Of the measures proposed in the NPHT roadmap, the only measures that were explicit related to 
taxes on alcohol and tobacco. Additional tobacco taxes have subsequently been imposed in both 
2010 and 2013, with additional alcohol taxes having not yet been imposed.  
 
In response to the NPHT report, the government released in 2010 its Taking Preventative Action: A 
response to the Australia: The Healthiest Country by 2020 report.17 In its response the then 
government “decided not to amend alcohol taxation further while Australia is in the middle of a 
wine glut and while there is an industry restructure under way”, however it did ask the newly 
formed ANPHA to “develop [a minimum (floor) price of alcohol] for further consideration by 
Government.”18 
  
                                                          
16
 National Preventative Health Taskforce. 2009. “Australia: The healthiest country by 2020 – The roadmap for 
action”. Commonwealth of Australia. Available at 
http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/internet/preventativehealth/publishing.nsf/Content/AEC223A781D64F
F0CA2575FD00075DD0/$File/nphs-overview.pdf.  
17
 Australian Government. 2010. “Taking Preventative Action: A response to Australia: The healthiest country 
by 2020”. Commonwealth of Australia. Available at 
http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/internet/preventativehealth/publishing.nsf/Content/6B7B17659424FB
E5CA25772000095458/$File/tpa.pdf. 
18
 Ibid. 
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6.0 The justification for behavioural taxes 
 
As outlined in Section 5.0, the primary objective of behavioural taxes is to influence the behaviour of 
individuals, with secondary objectives around the simplicity of revenue collection and offsetting the 
costs of publicly-incurred externalities from behaviour.  
 
However, the imposition of behavioural taxes requires them to be justified with a known problem 
such as excessive and/or harmful consumption of alcohol with the view that if they were imposed, 
individuals would be less likely to engage in this sort of behaviour. 
 
6.1 Established trends 
 
Imposing behavioural taxes also requires there to be an established problem that can then be 
addressed, measured and assessed for efficacy. Part of the challenge faced by policies designed to 
influence individual behaviour is that they are only one part of the factors influencing consumer’s 
decisions and cannot be easily and readily separated from other factors. The influence of individual 
policies also become mute when multiple policy measures are introduced that are designed to 
influence consumer behaviour.  
 
Figure 2 | Total per-capita consumption of alcohol, litres  
 
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2013. “Apparent consumption of alcohol, Australia”. 4307.0.55.001. Available at 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/4307.0.55.001Main%20Features82011-
12?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=4307.0.55.001&issue=2011-12&num=&view=. 
 
A recent example was the Federal government’s introduction of plain packaging on tobacco 
products. The measure came into force in late 2012 and could therefore be broadly measured for its 
efficacy in changing consumer behaviour. However, in July 2013 the Federal government announced 
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further increases to tobacco excise taxes.19 In doing so, any research of the efficacy of plain 
packaging would become increasingly difficult to separate from the influence of the additional tax 
increase.  
 
The other challenge in measures designed to influence consumer behaviour results from dissecting 
behaviour from an established trend. Australian consumption of alcohol already has a long-term 
trend of declining consumption. As outlined in Figure 2, ABS data clearly shows a long-term declining 
trend of per capita overall alcohol consumption amongst the Australian public since the 1970s, with 
relatively stable overall consumption levels since the 1990s.  
 
The most notable decline in alcohol consumption has resulted in a heavy decline in beer 
consumption that has almost halved in the past forty-years. As outlined in Figure 3, disaggregated 
data shows that the trend has been broadly consistent across all beer products with a decline in full-
strength and low-strength beer, with only mid-strength beer consumption remaining relatively 
stable.  
 
Figure 3 | Per-capita consumption of low, medium and full-strength beer, litres 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2013. “Apparent consumption of alcohol, Australia”. 4307.0.55.001. Available at 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/4307.0.55.001Main%20Features82011-
12?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=4307.0.55.001&issue=2011-12&num=&view=. 
 
While there has been some substitution from beer to other alcoholic products, the substitution has 
not been sufficient to offset the overall per capita decline in consumption of beer.  
 
During the same timeframe, the most significant growth has resulted from the increased 
consumption of wine which has nearly doubled. But even, as outlined in Figure 4, over the past 
decade the disaggregated consumption of wine has not been remarkable. Red wine consumption 
                                                          
19
 Bourke, L. 2013. “Kevin Rudd flags increase to tobacco excise ahead of release of Government’s economic 
statement”. ABC News. Available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-07-31/rudd-flags-tobacco-tax-
increase/4855836. 
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has increased from 8.61 litres annually consumer per capita to 10.38 litres, and white wine has 
grown from 13.5 litres to 15.12 litres. Total wine consumption has grown by only a little over three 
litres from 26.38 litres to 29.89 litres, an average growth of around 300 millilitres per year. 
 
Figure 4 | Per-capita wine consumption, litres 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2013. “Apparent consumption of alcohol, Australia”. 4307.0.55.001. Available at 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/4307.0.55.001Main%20Features82011-
12?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=4307.0.55.001&issue=2011-12&num=&view=. 
 
Since the 1970s there has been some growth in the consumption of spirits and ready-to-drink 
alcoholic beverages. It has been a slow and steady increase over four decades, with a modest decline 
in recent years. The other alcoholic beverage that has shown significant growth in recent years has 
been cider, which has seen a nearly three-fold increase in consumption in the past decade, but off 
an exceptionally low base of nearly zero consumption.  
 
As outlined in Figure 5, in more recent years the consumption of RTDs has increased somewhat from 
0.8 litres to 1.1 litres annually per capita from 2002-03 to 2007-08, before a sharp decline in 2007-08 
to 2008-09 and then a progressive decline year-on-year thereafter. The stark drop in consumption 
can directly be correlated to the introduction by the Rudd government of its excise on RTDs by 70 
per cent, making them less affordable for consumers.  
 
It should be noted that this is not the first time that alcopops have been taxed at differential rate. 
Prior to the 2000s they were taxed consistent with full-strength spirits, from 2000 to 2008 they were 
taxed equivalent to full-strength packaged beer,20 before attracting the alcopops tax.21  
 
However, the rapid decline in the consumption of RTDs was reflected in an immediate spike in the 
consumption of spirits at the same time which has remained relatively stable since. Unsurprisingly, 
following the alcopops tax there were reports that the intended targets, principally young female 
                                                          
20
 Excluding the 1.15 per cent excise-free threshold. 
21
 Carragher, N. & Chalmers, J. 2011. “What are the options? Pricing and taxation policy reforms to redress 
excessive alcohol consumption and related harms in Australia”. NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. 
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consumers, substituted RTDs with mixing their own spirits and cocktails to avoid the cost of the 
alcopops tax. By privately mixing drinks consumers didn’t just avoid the cost of the tax, they were 
also free to establish their own alcohol to mixture ratios allowing them to increase or decrease the 
amount of alcohol consumed.  
 
However, following the introduction of the alcopops tax there was no significant increase in the 
consumption of other alcoholic beverages from RTDs. The only modest rise that occurred, as 
outlined in Figure 6, was in the consumption of white table wine which has experienced extremely 
modest growth in the same timeframe. 
 
Figure 5 | Per-capita consumption of spirits and RTDs – pure alcohol, litres 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2013. “Apparent consumption of alcohol, Australia”. 4307.0.55.001. Available at 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/4307.0.55.001Main%20Features82011-
12?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=4307.0.55.001&issue=2011-12&num=&view=. 
 
While overall consumption of alcohol has declined, the most notable driver of changing consumer 
behaviour is toward buying premium products. Industry data has predicted that while there is 
expected to be an increase by a further 20.5 per cent in the period from 2012-13 to 2017-18, that 
growth is predicted to be driven by the consumption of higher-cost premium products. 22  
 
According to industry research, “Australia's beer drinking palate is becoming more sophisticated, 
with a number of European style beers now being produced” domestically while “traditional full-
strength lagers such as VB, Carlton Draught and Tooheys are losing market share in favour of cider 
and premium beer”.23 Meanwhile, despite the modest growth in the consumption of spirits, RTDs 
account for 64 per cent of spirits consumption.  
  
                                                          
22
 IBIS World. 2012. “Australians are drinking less but spending more”. Available at 
http://www.ibisworld.com.au/about/media/pressrelease/release.aspx?id=302. 
23
 Ibid. 
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Figure 6 | Per-capita consumption of select alcoholic drinks – pure alcohol, litres 
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics. 2013. “Apparent consumption of alcohol, Australia”. 4307.0.55.001. Available at 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/4307.0.55.001Main%20Features82011-
12?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=4307.0.55.001&issue=2011-12&num=&view=. 
 
 
Meanwhile Australia’s overall alcohol consumption levels are not radically different from 
comparable markets, with Australia’s alcohol consumption (9.8 litres consumed annually per capita) 
being on par with the United Kingdom at 11.75 litres and the United States at 8.61 litres. 
 
6.2 Non-established trends 
 
By comparison, the challenge faced for introducing behavioural taxes to address other known health 
challenges, notably obesity, is much more difficult. There are multiple dimensions to alcohol-related 
harm, but the primary objective is health related for consumers, as well as fuelling alcohol-related 
violence. These problems don’t sit in isolation as the consumption of illicit driugs, with or without 
alcohol, contribute to health problems and crime. But at least the relationship between intoxication 
can clearly be made between the consumption of alcohol.  
 
Obesity is not so clear. As demonstrated in the Federal government’s National Preventative Health 
Taskforce’s reports into obesity, the contributing factors to rising waistlines are numerous including 
consumption choices, physical exercise and an individual’s environment. While one single influence 
may significantly contribute to an individual’s obesity, the same cannot be consistently said on a 
population-wide level.24  
 
                                                          
24
 National Preventative Health Taskforce Obesity Working Group. 2009. “Australia: The healthiest country by 
2020 – Obesity in Australia: A need for urgent action”. Technical Report 1. Commonwealth of Australia. 
Available at 
http://www.preventativehealth.org.au/internet/preventativehealth/publishing.nsf/Content/E233F8695823F1
6CCA2574DD00818E64/$File/obesity-jul09.pdf.  
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Even from a consumption perspective obesity is technically more challenging. Almost all food and 
beverage products have the capacity to contribute to obesity and adding taxes on a specific product 
will only enable assessment on the impact of its consumption, but not its contribution to obesity, 
especially when substitution is easily achievable.  
 
As a consequence, developing policy responses whose efficacy can be reasonably assessed is 
extremely limited. While overall data can be collected on body mass indexes, rates of diabetes and 
the extent of average waistlines, the contribution of behavioural taxes on products to obesity rates 
is not straightforward. 
 
6.3 Assumed costs 
 
As outlined in Section 5.1, a key argument in favour of behavioural taxes is their capacity to 
internalise the cost of externalities, such as the health, public welfare and safety costs associated 
with consumption to individuals and society-at-large. As a consequence there has been an increasing 
shift toward calculating the assumed cost of behaviours to both justify intervention and provide a 
comparison for cost-benefit analyses for interventions.  
 
In any assessment of the assumed cost implications of behaviours to justify behavioural taxes are 
both public and private costs. Private costs involve costs incurred by the private sector, including the 
individual who engages in a behaviour such as direct consumption costs and incurred private costs 
from direct consumption, or their employer, such as through lost productivity. Public costs involve 
the impact on the government including costs to the public health system or an increased demand 
on police resources.  
 
From a public policy standpoint the assessment of a policy should be based on public costs because 
all other costs are borne by private citizens who can tolerate these costs or take corrective action as 
they see fit. In an effort to increase the overall cost to justify interventions, policy action advocates 
are highlighting the ‘social costs’ of peoples’ behaviour that seeks to combine both public and 
private costs to inflate them and heavily justify intervention. As identified by Crampton, Burgess and 
Taylor: 
 
By presenting costs drinkers impose upon themselves as social costs to the country, [cost of illness] 
measures … may help build popular support for paternalistic policies. Embedding paternalism in the 
assumptions of the model rather than advocating paternalistic policies directly appeals to voters’ 
pocketbooks … voters take the cost measures as impartial measures of the cost they’re called upon to 
bear due to others’ actions and shift outward their demand for corrective measures.
 25  
 
Table 3 | Estimated annual “social costs” for Australia 
 
Issue Annual “social cost”  
Alcohol $15.3 billion 
Gambling $4.7 billion 
Obesity $58 billion 
Tobacco $31.5 billion 
 
Sources: Deloitte Access Economics, Productivity Commission & Australian National Preventative Health Taskforce 
 
                                                          
25
 Crampton, E., Burgess, M. & Taylor, B. 2011. “The cost of cost studies”. University of Canterbury. Available at 
http://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/RePEc/cbt/econwp/1129.pdf. 
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But the validity of calculated ‘social costs’ are deeply dubious. The questionable nature of social 
costs was highlighted in research by Crampton which found that of the $15.3 billion of social costs 
annually incurred as a result of alcohol consumption, only $4 billion was public costs with the 
remainder private costs. Equally, the $4 billion public costs mirrored the tax revenue raised by the 
government.26 
 
  
                                                          
26
 Kenny, C. 2011. “Social costs of alcohol ‘are vastly inflated’”. The Australian. 08/07/2011. Available at 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/social-costs-of-alcohol-are-vastly-inflated/story-fn59niix-
1226090176946. 
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7.0 The efficacy of behavioural taxes 
 
The assumption behind behavioural taxes is that the government imposes additional taxes on a 
deemed undesirable consumer behaviour in an effort to reduce it, or price consumers out of it. The 
broad-based and non-discriminatory nature of behavioural taxes makes it a straightforward policy to 
implement, with identified benefits to government revenue.  
 
Figure 7 outlines the structural intent of imposing taxes on consumer products, using the example of 
alcohol. The connection between increased taxes is a linear relationship between consuming, 
excessive consumption and subsequent harmful consequences.27 
 
Figure 7 | Conceptual model for the casual relationship between increased taxes and 
decreased consumption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elder, R. W., Lawrence, B., Ferguson, A., Naimi, T. S., Brewer, R. D., Chattopadhyay, S. K., Toomey, T. L. & Fielding, J. E. 2010. “The 
Effectiveness of Tax Policy Interventions for Reducing Excessive Alcohol Consumption and Harms”. American Journal of Preventative 
Medicine. v38. i2. pp217 – 229.  
 
As the International Centre for Alcohol Policy has identified: 
 
The rationale behind increasing taxation on alcohol as a policy measure is relatively simple – 
by making beverage alcohol more expensive, per capita consumption will be creased and 
with it the incidence of problems. The public health perspective, which is not necessarily 
concerned with economic efficiency or corporate profitability, sees curbing alcohol 
                                                          
27
 International Center for Alcohol Policies. 2006. “Alcohol Taxation”. ICAP Reports 18. Available at 
http://www.icap.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Gf4%2BQD%2BX1hU%3D&tabid=75. 
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consumption as a means of preventing a range of social and health problems and reducing 
the alcohol-related burden on society.28 
 
This is a broad assumption backed up by the WHO. The WHO’s Global strategy to reduce the harmful 
use of alcohol has advocated: 
 
Consumers, including heavy drinkers and young people, are sensitive to changes in the price 
of drinks. Pricing policies can be used to reduce underage drinking, to halt progression 
towards drinking large volumes of alcohol and/or episodes of heavy drinking, and to 
influence consumers’ preferences. Increasing the price of alcoholic beverages is one of the 
most effective interventions to reduce harmful use of alcohol. A key factor for the success of 
price-related policies in reducing harmful use of alcohol is an effective and efficient system 
for taxation matched by adequate tax collection and enforcement.29 
 
Such assumptions rely on a relatively linear approach to consumer behaviours. Figure 7 outlines that 
there is little consideration in addressing “decreased harmful consequences” towards behaviour that 
does not lead to that conclusion, such as moderate consumption.  
 
The case of alcohol is particularly pertinent because of the direct relationship between the use of 
excise taxation as a blunt instrument to influence the behaviour of individuals and its efficacy. The 
merits of excise taxation is particularly relevant following the recent publication by the University of 
New South Wales that shows the overall consumption of alcohol amongst Australians continues to 
decline, with a small minority of heavy drinkers increasing their behaviour.  
 
7.1 The fallacy of treating all consumers the same 
 
The theory behind using taxes as a blunt and indiscriminate instrument to change behaviour 
assumes that it has broadly the same impact across all consumers – that it will reduce consumption. 
Data increasingly shows that imposing taxes doesn’t have the intended effect. This was the 
conclusion of a recent report from London Economics that identified additional taxes did influence 
the behaviour of moderate drinkers, but did little to change the behaviour of heavy drinkers: 
 
The studies that compare moderate and heavier drinkers directly using individual‐level data 
and the comprehensive meta‐analysis study mentioned above provide convincing evidence 
that, at the aggregate level, heavier drinkers are less responsive to prices changes than 
moderate drinkers. This finding has important implications for policy makers. It implies that, 
if all alcohol prices were to increase by a similar percentage, the resulting overall reduction 
in alcohol consumption by heavy drinkers (also in percentage terms) is likely to be less than 
that of moderate drinkers.30 
 
The study goes on outlining: 
 
The evidence regarding the impact of price changes on substitution between alcohol 
products by moderate and heavy drinkers is more mixed. However, the most comprehensive 
study … finds that hazardous drinkers show the greatest level of substitution behaviour: 
                                                          
28
 Ibid. 
29
 World Health Organisation. 2010. “Global strategy to reduce the harmful use of alcohol”. Available at 
http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/alcstratenglishfinal.pdf. 
30
 London Economics. 2012. “Differential price responsiveness among drinker types”. Working Paper. 
December. Available at http://www.londecon.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Differential-price-
responsiveness-among-drinker-types-LE-Working-paper-Dec-2012.pdf. 
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switching by hazardous drinkers “is an order of magnitude greater than that estimated for 
moderate drinkers” for some beverage types.31 
 
Concluding: 
 
If all alcohol prices were to increase by a similar percentage, the resulting overall reduction 
in alcohol consumption by heavy drinkers (also in percentage terms) is likely to be less than 
that of moderate drinkers … and targeting the price of a particular beverage type (e.g. beer 
or cider) is unlikely to significantly reduce the overall alcohol consumption of heavier 
drinkers, since these drinkers would be likely to simply switch to an alternative beverage 
type.32 
 
The London Economics study is not alone. The objective of behavioural taxes can be to target all 
consumers equally, but that assumes that all will broadly be impacted and respond equally. 
Behaviour will differ between heavy and moderate drinkers, but the response also appears to be 
different from drinkers in different age groups.  
 
A report completed for the European Commission into the price affordability of alcohol and harm 
identified that, in isolation, the efficacy of tax policies was limited in addressing harm-related issues 
with alcohol consumption.33 And a 2007 study identified that despite their relatively low incomes, 
teenage drinkers “are least responsive to price” and therefore increasing taxes to change behaviour 
is likely to be ineffective.34 
 
The absurdity of treating all drinkers with the same blunt instruments are now being supported by 
local Australian research. A recent report from the University of New South Wales’ National Drug 
and Alcohol Research Centre identified that consumption of alcohol has increased amongst the 
nation’s top 10 per cent drinkers, while moderate drinkers have reduced their consumption.  
 
The study concluded that the top 10 ten per cent of drinkers are now consuming an additional 4-5 
per cent more than a decade ago, and account for 52 per cent of all alcohol consumption. 
Meanwhile an increasing number of Australians are abstaining from alcohol all together and light 
drinkers were reducing their consumption.35  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Rabinovich, L., Brutscher, P., de Vries, H., Tiessen, J., Clift, J. & Reding, A. 2009. “The Affordability of Alcoholic 
Beverages in the European Union: Understanding the link between alcohol affordability consumption and 
harms”.  Report for the European Commission DG SANCO. Available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR689.sum.pdf 
34
 Gallet, C. A. 2007. “The demand for alcohol: A meta-analysis of elasticities”. The Australian Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics. v51. pp121-135. 
35
 National Drug and Alcohol Research Centre. 2013. “Increase in heavy drinkers leading to more harm, new 
Australian analysis shows”. University of New South Wales. News Release. Available at 
http://ndarc.med.unsw.edu.au/news/increase-heavy-drinkers-leading-more-harm-new-australian-analysis-
shows. 
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Case study 1 | Australia and Denmark’s ‘fat tax’ 
 
In 2011, the Danish government introduced the world’s first explicit ‘fat tax’ as a measure to 
promote healthier lifestyles. The additional 2.3 per cent tax applied to saturated fats to 
increase the price of food that was deemed to contribute towards obesity and heart disease. 
The tax added an additional approximately AUD$3 to each kilogram of saturated fat product 
and was passed through to consumers through higher prices. From its introduction the tax 
faced resistance from Danes who argued that the government should not attempt to steer 
people’s behaviour and increase the price of food. This was supported by businesses that were 
against increasing costs and local industries whose products became less competitive.36  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The tax had many supporters arguing that taxation was an effective means to change people’s 
behaviour and was necessary to curb rates of obesity. Health activists outside of Denmark also 
proposed other countries adopt a fat tax proposal, including Australia.37 Australia’s Obesity 
Policy Coalition supported the broad principle of Australia introducing a 20 per cent ‘fat tax’ 
coupled with subsidies for healthier foods. Reportedly, one of the chief advocates from this 
Coalition argued “Tax has been used to decrease smoking and alcohol consumption very 
successfully in Australia, so we need to look at how it could be used to improve our diets.”38  
 
Continued on next page …  
 
 
   
 
  
                                                          
36
 American Broadcasting Corporation. 2011. “Denmark introduces ‘fat tax’ to foods high in saturated fat”. 
ABCNews. Available at http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/health/2011/10/02/denmark-introduces-fat-tax-on-
foods-high-in-saturated-fat/.  
37
 Betts, M. 2012. “Fat tax to fight obesity”. The Advertiser. Available at 
http://www.news.com.au/money/cost-of-living/fat-tax-to-fight-obesity-crisis/story-fnagkbpv-1226360023728 
38
 Marriner, C. 2011. “Anyone for a great big, fat tax?”. Sydney Morning Herald. Available at 
http://www.smh.com.au/national/anyone-for-a-great-big-fat-tax-20111015-1lq4i.html#ixzz2fKnnT4ED. 
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Case study 1 | Continued 
 
Despite heavy support from health activists for the Danish ‘fat tax’ it was subsequently 
dropped by the Danish government after a period of only 15 months. The government dropped 
the tax admitting the tax was not successful in cutting waistlines but risked jobs, with the 
Danish Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Minister, Mette Gjerskov, stating “the fat tax is one of 
the most maligned we [have] had in a long time”.39  
 
The demise of the tax drew a sharp rebuke from some Australian academics. An academic from 
the WHO’s Collaborating Centre on Obesity Prevention at Deakin University argued food 
companies were behind the removal of the tax, and that the tax was not evaluated for 
efficacy.40 
 
That no longer holds true. A subsequent study from the Institute of Economic Affairs following 
the end of the Danish experiment found that the tax was ineffective. Snowden’s The proof of 
the pudding report concluded that Danes “switched to cheaper brands or went over the border 
to Sweden and Germany to do their shopping”. 41  
 
The report also concluded that “the fat tax had a very limited impact on the consumption of 
‘unhealthy’ foods … [and] one survey found that only seven per cent of the population reduced 
the amount of butter, cream and cheese they bought and another survey found that 80 per 
cent of Danes did not change their shopping habits at all.”42  
 
 
   
  
                                                          
39
 Bomsdorf, B. 2012. “Denmark scraps much-maligned ‘fat tax’ after a year”. Wall Street Journal. Available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323894704578113120622763136.html. 
40
 Carey, K. “Denmark dropping of “fat tax” criticised by Deakin University researcher”. Australian Food News. 
Available at http://www.ausfoodnews.com.au/2012/11/20/denmark%E2%80%99s-dropping-of-
%E2%80%9Cfat-tax%E2%80%9D-criticised-by-deakin-university-researcher.html. 
41
 Snowden, C. 2013. “The proof of the pudding: Denmark’s fat tax fiasco”. Institute of Economic Affairs. IEA 
Current Controversies Paper n42. Available at 
http://www.iea.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/files/The%20Proof%20of%20the%20Pudding.pdf. 
42
 Ibid. 
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8.0 The equity of behavioural taxes 
 
The assumption supporting behavioural taxes is that they primarily target luxury or non-essential 
goods and therefore contribute toward a progressive tax system as only those with sufficient 
disposable income are impacted. Yet, the data tends to show the reverse is the case. 
 
The progressive nature of excise taxes on sin commodities was identified by the IMF. According to 
McCarten & Stotsky “empirical evidence suggests that excises on tobacco products and beer are 
regressive. The empirical results for liquor are mixed … [and] sugar taxes are typically highly 
regressive and for this reason should be avoided.”43 
 
Taxes that target sugar, salt and fat – such as the Danish fat tax (See Case Study 1) – explicitly act as 
regressive taxes because they harm all consumers on broadly non-essential goods. They also act as 
regressive taxes because they proportionately hit a larger share of household expenditure, especially 
for lower income earners.  
 
As Figure 8 outlines after housing costs, food and non-alcoholic beverages are the second highest 
cost for the average Australian household. Combined with alcoholic beverages, food and non-
alcoholic beverages become the highest weekly household expenditure group exceeding housing.  
 
Figure 8 | Average weekly household expenditure on goods and services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Household expenditure Survey, Summary of Results, 2009-10, catalogue no 6530.0. 
 
The costs for food and all beverages is not just borne by all households - they disproportionately 
impact on poorer households. Based on ABS data the contribution of food and non-alcoholic 
beverages to household income is disproportionately higher amongst the lowest-income families in 
Australia. As Table 4 outlines, nearly 20 per cent of the lowest quintile household incomes spent on 
food and non-alcoholic beverages, compared to only 15 per cent for the highest quintile households. 
While alcohol is a less regressive tax, that is likely a result of the fact that the tight financial position 
of those on the lowest income quintile can only marginally afford alcoholic beverages, and combined 
lower income households spend a greater share of their household income on these consumer 
products.  
 
                                                          
43
 McCarten, W. J. & Stotsky, J. “Excise Taxes” in Shome, P. ed. 1995. “Tax policy handbook”. International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Washington DC, United States of America. pp100–03. 
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Table 4 | Percentage of household income spent on food and alcoholic and non-alcoholic 
beverages 
 
 Lowest 
income 
quintile 
Second 
income 
quintile 
Third income 
quintile 
Fourth 
income 
quintile 
Highest 
income 
quintile 
Food and non-
alcoholic 
beverages 
18.33 18.27 16.75 16.62 15.19 
Alcohol 1.92 2.40 2.67 2.67 2.62 
Food & 
alcoholic 
beverages 
20.25 20.68 19.42 19.29 18.01 
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Household expenditure Survey, 2009-10, number 6530.0. 
 
The cost burden becomes even more regressive when assessed against households on the 
vulnerability of low-income households, including those dependent on welfare. Australians on aged 
pensions spend a disproportionately high share of their income on food and non-alcoholic beverages 
in comparison to even those on the lowest income quintile, and especially in comparison to those on 
the highest income quintile.  
 
Table 5 | Percentage of households on government support spent on food and non-
alcoholic beverages 
 
Receives age 
pensions 
Receives 
disability and 
carer payments 
Receives 
unemployment & 
study payments 
Receives family 
support 
payments 
Receives other 
payments 
20.8 18.1 20.5 19.5 20.9 
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Household expenditure Survey, 2009-10, number 6530.0 
 
While proposals for ‘fat taxes’ are regularly flagged, it is regularly ignored that Australia already has 
an unintended, operational ‘fat tax’. During negotiations to introduce the GST, the Howard 
government and the Australian Democrats negotiated to exclude fresh, unprocessed foods from 
attracting the 10 per cent tax. As a consequence, processed and non-fresh food products attract a 
ten per cent tax and have done so for a decade at a time when it has been argued that obesity rates 
have risen.  
 
The explicitly regressive nature of proposed behavioural ‘fat taxes’ designed to reduce consumption 
of salty, sugary and fatty foods was addressed by the Institute of Public Affairs in 2012. According to 
Novak’s Nanny State Taxes: Soaking the Poor in 2012 report a ‘fat tax’ would disproportionately hit 
lower-income families as it increased the overall share of their disposable income on food products, 
while delivering a boom for government revenue. Using ABS data Novak calculated a proposed 20 
per cent ad valorem ‘fat tax’ could increase government revenue by an additional $268 million per 
annum. Of that additional $268 million, a share of $39 million would hit low-income households 
acting as a deeply regressive tax against the poor to buy food staples.  
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Figure 9 | Additional government revenue from low-income household due to a fat tax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Novak, J. 2012. “Nanny state taxes: Soaking the poor in 2012”. Institute of Public Affairs. Available at 
http://www.ipa.org.au/library/publication/1335389416_document_novak_nannystatetaxes.pdf. 
 
8.1 Substitution issues 
 
As outlined in Section 5.0, the objective of behavioural taxation is designed to reduce consumption 
of an identified product that is targeted by excise taxation. This method assumes that the targeted 
product can be isolated and consumers will not then substitute for alternative products.  
 
Assessing substitution can be difficult, especially when law-abiding consumers substitute their legal 
consumption behaviour to illegal conduct. Unsurprisingly otherwise law-abiding consumers are 
unlikely to report that they have substitute from a legal product to an illegal one. Assessing the 
prevalence of substitution has been a common problem with the efficacy of policies surrounding 
illicit drugs, because data can only be collected on the basis that consumers admit they have 
engaged in unlawful activity. 44  
 
The same broad challenges surround substitution for tobacco products, because substitution from 
legal tobacco products can be presumed to lead to consumers switching to black market tobacco 
products such as loose leaf ‘chop-chop’ or counterfeit tobacco products. There appears to be little 
data available, as identified by Pra and Arnade, of data on the impact of behavioural taxation that 
                                                          
44
 Carragher, N. & Chalmers, J. 2011. “What are the options? Pricing and taxation policy reforms to redress 
excessive alcohol consumption and related harms in Australia”. NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. 
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considers “the cross-price effect or substitutability of cigarettes with other tobacco-containing 
products”.45 
 
Section 7.1 outlined the changes in consumer behaviour following the introduction of the alcopops 
tax. It is not in dispute that the alcopops tax did have an impact on the consumption of RTD 
beverages. A study by Doran and Digiusto identified the rate of consumption of RTD beverages 
increased in the lead up to the imposition of the alcopops tax from 11.52 litres per year in 2004 to 
11.79 litres in 2007, before falling to 11.55 and 11.41 litres in 2008 and 2009, respectively.46  
 
However, the perceived benefits of reduced consumption may have been over-stated. A 2011 study 
by the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research concluded: 
 
In general, it appears that the increase led to an immediate reduction in alcopops sales; 
however, there is evidence of some substitution with other alcoholic beverages and the 
most recent sales data suggests that the downward correction may be over.47 
 
Despite the tax cutting the rate of consumption of RTDs, the data suggests that consumers partly 
substituted for straight spirits and possibly white wine. The substitution for straight spirits is 
particularly concerning because the tax prompted consumers to switch from pre-measured, pre-
mixed drinks to self-measured and mixed drinks with the potential to actually increase consumption.  
 
The problem with the alcopops tax, as shown by the other collected data sets, is that it did little or 
nothing to cut overall drinking rates, reduce alcohol-related violence or prompted the key targets of 
the policy to substitute.  
 
Some researchers have suggested that the alcopops tax was ineffective because it was too specific 
and didn’t succeed in reducing overall alcohol consumption. A study completed by the University of 
Queensland concluded that a product-specific tax was unlikely to change consumer behaviour and 
using hospital admission rates in the Gold Coast as a data set, the tax didn’t change the incidence of 
alcohol-related harm.48 
 
The broader concern relating to substitution extends beyond the targeted product category. An 
increasing concern surrounding behavioural taxes is that consumers don’t just seek to substitute 
within the same product category, an alcopop for straight spirits or white wine, but they substitute 
for goods that provide comparable perceived ‘benefits’, including illicit drugs.  
 
As identified by the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research: 
 
Research evaluating the impact of alcohol price on illicit drug use in the general population is 
sparse, inconclusive and largely limited to cannabis use. Some studies provide evidence that 
                                                          
45
 Pra, M. D. & Arnade, C. 2009. “Tobacco product demand, cigarette taxes and market substitution”. Paper 
presented at Agricultural & Applied Economics Association and American Council on Consumer Interests.  
46
 Doran, C. M. & Erold, D. 2011. “Using taxes to curb drinking: A report card on the Australian government’s 
alcopops tax”. Drug and Alcohol Review. v30, i6. pp677-680. 
47
 Carragher, N. & Chalmers, J. 2011. “What are the options? Pricing and taxation policy reforms to redress 
excessive alcohol consumption and related harms in Australia”. NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. 
48
 Kisely, S. R., Pais, J., White, A., Connor, J., Quek, L. Crillly, J. L. & Lawrence, D. 2011. “Effect of the increase in 
“alcopops” tax on alcohol-related harms in young people: a controlled interrupted time series. Medical Journal 
of Australia. v11. i195. Available at https://www.mja.com.au/journal/2011/195/11/effect-increase-alcopops-
tax-alcohol-related-harms-young-people-controlled.  
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cannabis acts as a substitute for alcohol in Australian samples whereas other studies have 
found inconclusive results or evidence that alcohol is a complement to other drug use.49 
 
However the data now appears to be more conclusive. Following the introduction of the alcopops 
tax researchers have identified that some consumers may have substituted for illicit drugs. 50 
Further, recent research from Deakin University finds that should taxes increase sufficiently on 
alcoholic products, consumers will substitute for ecstasy or marijuana.51 
 
Figure 10 | Prices of alcoholic beverages relative to prices of all consumer items 
(December 1989 is parity), Australia, March 1990 to March 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Carragher, N. & Chalmers, J. 2011. “What are the options? Pricing and taxation policy reforms to redress excessive alcohol 
consumption and related harms in Australia”. NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. 
 
The other risk of substitution results from increasing consumption to offset potential cost increases. 
A trend has emerged where young Australians going out at night preload on cheaper alcoholic 
beverages or illicit drugs in their, or their friends’ homes before going to nightclubs to avoid higher 
alcohol costs at venues.  
 
Figure 10 outlines the potential cause for this behaviour. In recent years, excluding wine,52 alcohol 
has seen a significant increase in price compared to other consumer items. Beer and spirits have all 
experienced significant price rises, but the most notable spike relates to spirits at the same time as 
the introduction of the alcopops tax. 
 
                                                          
49
 Carragher, N. & Chalmers, J. 2011. “What are the options? Pricing and taxation policy reforms to redress 
excessive alcohol consumption and related harms in Australia”. NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. 
50
 Johnston, C. & Argoon, A. 2010. “Alcohol price spike fuels switch to ecstasy”. The Age. 23/10/2010. Available 
at http://www.theage.com.au/national/alcohol-price-spike-fuels-switch-to-ecstasy-20101022-16xvj.html. 
51
 Miller, P.G. & Droste, N. 2013. “Alcohol price considerations on alcohol and illicit drug use in university 
students”. Journal of Alcoholism & Drug Dependency”. v1. i2. Available at 
http://www.esciencecentral.org/journals/JALDD/JALDD-1-109.pdf. 
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 Wine has experienced a glut in recent years which has partly contributed to a reduction in retail prices.  
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A study by Turning Point Alcohol Drug Centre identified that three-quarters of Victorians between 18 
and 24 were now preloading on alcohol before attending a late night venue.53 Broadly similar data 
has been identified by the Foundation for Alcohol Research and Education with 57 per cent of pre-
loaders identifying they engage in this behaviour to save money.54 
 
The relevance of pre-loading identifies the risks of substitution when individual product or venue-
specific taxes are imposed. Those targeted, particularly young people, are acutely aware of the 
financial implications and therefore adjust their behaviour to avoid incurring additional costs, but 
avoid changing their overall consumption intent and behaviour. 
 
8.2 Risks of increased consumption 
 
The assumption behind behavioural taxes is that they will influence and reduce the targeted 
consumer behaviour by making it more expensive and less affordable for consumers. But that 
assumes that all consumers are price-sensitive, and that there are limited avenues for substitution to 
other products. As outlined in Section 8.1, there is clearly an issue around substitution from legal 
products to illegal products, as well as to other ‘like’ products as a consequence of the introduction 
of behavioural taxes.  
 
Data also suggests that, despite the intent of reducing overall consumption, behavioural taxes can 
have the reverse impact and actually lead to greater consumption.  
 
The current extent of tobacco excise taxes has essentially made the products unaffordable for many 
Australians and subsequently priced consumers out of the legal market. However that assumes that 
all consumers only seek legal alternatives and then don’t consume illegal products that can be 
purchased at lower prices enabling them to consume more.  
 
While the author has not identified that behavioural shift occurring with tobacco products, it does 
appear to have occurred with increased behavioural taxes on alcohol products. Researchers at the 
Californian Prevention Research Centre used Swedish sales and price data sets from the mid-1980s 
to mid-1990s to assess the impact that taxes had on consumption behaviour.  
 
The subsequent 2009 study found that increasing behavioural taxes on alcohol can increase 
consumption amongst some groups as consumers switch from buying premium brands and purchase 
higher volumes of cheaper brands.55 
 
The role that taxes can play to create perverse incentives was outlined earlier in the Henry Review. 
As the Henry Review outlined in its assessment of alcohol taxes: 
 
Taken together, current alcohol taxes reflect contradictory policies. They encourage people to drink 
cheap wine over expensive wine, wine from small rather than large producers, beer in pubs rather 
than at home, and brandy rather than spirits, and to purchase alcohol at airport duty-free stores. As a 
                                                          
53
 VicHealth. 2012. “Experts warn against ‘preloading’ on alcohol ahead of schoolies”. News Release. Available 
at http://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/Media-Centre/Media-Releases-by-Topic/Alcohol/Experts-warn-against-
preloading-on-alcohol-ahead-of-Schoolies-Week.aspx.  
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 Foundation for Alcohol Research and Education. 2013. “Drinking before going to a pub, club or bar 
(preloading)”. Available at http://www.fare.org.au/research-development/community-polling/annual-alcohol-
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 Gruenewald, P. J., Ponicki, W. R., Holder, H. D. & Romelsjö. 2006. “Alcohol prices, beverage quality, and the 
demand for alcohol: quality substitutions and price elasticities”. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental 
Research. v30. i1. 
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consequence, consumers tend to be worse off to the extent that these types of decisions to purchase 
and consume, which may have no spillover cost implications, are partly determined by tax.
 56
 
 
These examples outline the risk that product-specific taxes ultimately lead to perverse consumption 
behaviour. The claimed ‘benefit’ of introducing such taxes can also be outweighed by unintended 
consequences.  
 
  
                                                          
56
 The Treasury. 2010. “Australia’s Future Tax System: Final Report: Detailed Analysis – Chapter E5: Alcohol 
Taxation”. Commonwealth of Australia. Available at 
http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/FinalReport.aspx?doc=html/Publications/Papers/Final_Report_Part_
2/chapter_e5.htm.  
   
   
February 2014 Institute of Public Affairs 32 
 
9.0 Conclusions 
 
Good intentions are pointless if they are matched with perverse and damaging outcomes. This is 
often the story of behavioural taxes that appear to deliver unintended consequences for both 
governments and consumers alike.  
 
With the ‘costs’ of private consumption choices being passed onto the public through single-payer 
healthcare systems, there is an increasing focus by government about how behavioural taxes can be 
used to internalise the cost of externalities and use taxes to discourage deemed undesirable 
behaviour.  
 
Behavioural taxes, notably excise taxes, are a blunt instrument that is assumed to be an effective 
tool to influence behaviour. As a blunt instrument behavioural taxes are imposed on the public 
consistently, but the consequences on consumers are not always consistent.  
 
The most perverse, unintended consequences of behavioural taxes appear to result from alcohol 
taxation. The perverse consequences of alcohol behavioural taxation are likely a result of the nature 
of the product – it is broadly consumed and there is a complex matrix of applied excise taxes.  
 
Recent data from the imposition of the Rudd government’s 2008 alcopops tax provides a clear 
indication of how a well-intended policy can lead to highly undesirable consequences.  
 
The claimed objective of the alcopops tax was to cut consumption rates of RTDs amongst women. 
While there was a decline in the consumption of RTDs, consumers substituted with privately mixed 
straight spirits and white wine, which saw an immediate consumption spike.  
 
There is also increasing academic evidence that higher alcohol taxes may lead to consumers 
switching to illicit drugs. The alcopops tax in particular prompted some consumers to substitute 
expensive RTDs with illicit drugs.  
 
The unintended consequences are not just limited to the application of the alcopops tax. The 
generally rising price of alcohol at venues, which is heavily influenced by behavioural taxes, is leading 
young people to engage in risky ‘preloading’ by consuming large volumes of cheaper alcohol in 
private homes before going to a bar or club.    
 
Similarly, behavioural taxes for alcohol appear to be less effective on young people who have higher 
disposable incomes, and recent data suggests that they are effective in changing the behaviours of 
moderate drinkers, but not heavy drinkers. Increasing behavioural taxes can lead consumers to 
switch from fewer, expensive products to consuming higher volumes of cheaper products, 
prompting a rise in the consumption of products that are intended to be reduced.  
 
By comparison food-specific, non-sales taxes are relatively recent and governments are only starting 
to experiment with them, though so far with limited or no ‘benefit’.  
 
The Danish experiment with a ‘fat tax’ did not deliver the claimed benefits proposed when it was 
originally introduced. There was no significant, identified reduction in the behaviour that the 
government sought to target – a reduction in the consumption of saturated fats. However there 
were unintended changes in behaviour such as a decline in the competitiveness of Danish food 
manufacturing and a rise in the number of consumers who shopped across-borders to avoid paying 
the tax. Unsurprisingly the consumers in the best position to shop across national borders are also 
those who are less likely to be price sensitive. 
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There are clear unintended consequences from tobacco behavioural taxes. The highly-regulated 
nature of the sector and declining consumption rates show that the principle concern is on the 
switch from a very expensive and highly-regulated legal product to less-expensive and illegal or 
counterfeit product.  
 
As identified by the government’s own tax reviews, the complexity and inconsistency of alcohol 
taxes is leading to perverse and unintended consequences. The Henry Tax Review recommended the 
adoption of a standardised volumetric tax for alcohol.  
 
This paper does not assess the relative merits of volumetric taxation, but the principle of 
standardisation to treat all alcohol products equally does have merit on the grounds of non-
discrimination. However, any change in taxation should not be used as a justification to increase 
taxes on existing alcohol products. 
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